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Wage shares have declined substantially in all OECD countries and most developing 
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panel of up to 43 developing and 28 advanced economies (1970-2007) to explain changes in 
wage shares and assess the relative contributions of technological change, financialisation, 
globalisation and welfare state retrenchment. We find strong negative effects of 
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economies since 1980. This study uses a new ILO/IILS dataset on adjusted wage shares for a 
panel of up to 43 developing and 28 advanced economies (1970-2007) to explain changes in 
wage shares and assess the relative contributions of technological change, financialisation, 
globalisation and welfare state retrenchment. We find strong negative effects of 
financialisation as well as negative effects of welfare state retrenchment. Globalisation (in 
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1 Introduction 
The past 30 years have seen dramatic changes in income distribution, with top incomes, in 
particular in the USA, rising to levels unseen in two generations (Piketty and Saez 2003) and 
wage shares falling substantially since about 1980 across all OECD countries. This has led to 
a renewed interest in the determinants of the distribution of income. Changes in personal 
income distribution have had more prominence (Atkinson et al 2011, OECD 2011, Autor et al 
1999), but there is also an increasing interest in the determinants of functional income 
distribution. The literature here falls into four relatively independent groups. First, 
mainstream (modern neoclassical) economics contributions argue that technological change 
(IMF 2007a, EC 2007) is the main driver of income distribution. Second, the Political 
Economy of globalisation approach has highlighted the effects of globalisation on the 
bargaining power of labour and capital. It differs from the neoclassical approach in 
highlighting the effects of globalisation on bargaining power (Rodrik 1997). Third, similar in 
spirit, but with a different focus, a literature coming from the social sciences regards changes 
in income distribution as the result of distributional struggle and emphasises the role of 
welfare state retrenchment and the decline of the unions (Kristal 2010, Hancke 2012, 
Bengtsson 2014). Forth, there is a growing literature on financialisation, which also highlights 
its distributional impact, but few studies have examined the influence of financialisation on 
the functional income distribution so far (Stockhammer 2009, Dünhaupt 2013). The empirical 
analysis has almost exclusively focused on advanced economies. Only the second stream has 
made attempts to cover developing countries.  
 
This study investigates the determinants of functional income distribution and seeks to 
identify the contributions of technological change, globalisation, financialisation, and welfare 
state retrenchment. This is done with an (unbalanced) panel analysis covering up to 71 
countries (28 advanced and 43 developing and emerging economies) from 1970 to 2007. The 
contribution of the paper is that it integrates insights from all four debates and uses a broad 
sample of countries that include advanced as well as developing economies. This has the 
advantage of more variation in the countries and it allows for richer analysis of the effects of 
globalisation, however it comes at the price of limitations in data availability. We use the 
private, self-employment adjusted wage share as the dependent variable and offer a rich set of 
robustness checks.  
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 will discuss changes in functional income 
distribution and contextualises these within broader changes in income distribution. Section 3 
presents the key determinants of functional income distribution identified by different theories 
and offers a review of the recent empirical literature that uses panel data analysis. Section 4 
discusses the estimation methodology and data sources. Section 5 presents the econometrics 
results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Changes in income distribution 
 
In the last quarter century dramatic changes in the personal distribution as well as to the 
functional distribution of income have taken place. In the advanced economies
1
 the adjusted 
wage share has, on average, fallen from 73.4% in 1980 to 64.0% in 2007 (Figure 1). Changes 
in income distribution have taken somewhat different forms in different countries. In the 
Anglo-Saxon countries a sharp polarisation of personal income distribution has occurred, 
combined with a moderate decline in the wage share. In the USA the top 1% of the income 
distribution increased their share of national income by more than 10 percentage points 
(Piketty und Saez 2003, OECD 2008, Atkinson et al 2011) and the wage share has declined 
from 70.0% to 64.9% (2007). In continental European countries functional rather than 
personal income distribution has shifted dramatically, with comparatively moderate changes 
in personal distribution (OECD 2008, 2011). In Germany the adjusted wage share has 
declined from 72.2% to 61.8%.  
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
Data on the functional income distribution is not readily available for developing economies
2
 
and often less reliable. Figure 2 gives summary measures of the adjusted wage share for the 
groups of developing countries where comparatively long series are available. DVP3 
summarizes the data for three countries where data are available since 1970; DVP5 for five 
countries where data are available from 1979; and DVP16 for a group of sixteen developing 
                                                 
1
 We use ‘advanced’ economies to include all high income OECD countries except South Korea.  
2
 We use the term ‘developing countries’ as short hand for developing and emerging countries and include all 
countries that are not classified as high income countries by the World Bank. We include South Korea in this 
group as it has been a developing country for much of the sample period. 
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countries, where data are available from 1993. They all show a pronounced decline in 
(adjusted) wage shares since 1990. Among developing countries with at least ten years of 
adjusted wage share data there are 14 countries (Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
China, Cote d'Ivoire, Mexico, Namibia, Oman, Panama, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, 
Turkey) with declining wage share, three (Mauritius, Russia, Sri Lanka) with broadly stable 
wage shares and seven (Belarus, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Kenya, Peru) with 
increasing wage shares. While there is more variation in terms of the development of the 
wage share in developing economies than in advanced economies, it is clear that on average 
there has been a pronounced decline in the wage share in developing and emerging 
economies, at least since 1990. 
 
 [Figure 2 around here] 
 
For developing countries as well, the decline in the wage share is part of a broader trend in 
income distribution where social inequalities have increased. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) 
conclude a comprehensive survey of personal distribution in developing countries: “the 
evolution of various measures of inequality suggests that most of the developing countries 
experienced an increase in inequality during the past two decades” (Goldberg and Pavcnik 
2007, 54; similar OECD 2011, chapter 2).  
 
A discussion of the link between personal and functional income distribution is beyond the 
scope of this paper (see Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa 2007 and Wolff and Zacharias 2007). 
While developments appear rather different in Anglo-Saxon countries and continental Europe 
at first sight, they share the common trend that the share of non-managerial wage earners in 
national income has decreased sharply. The remuneration of top managers is counted as 
labour compensation in the National Accounts.
3
 If they were counted as part of profits, trends 
in the USA and in continental Europe would look rather similar.  
 
                                                 
3
 Mohun (2006) calculates adjusted profit shares based on the distinction between supervisory and non-
supervisory workers for the USA. This shows a much sharper increase in profit shares than the raw data.  
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3 Determinants of functional income distribution: key 
arguments in the recent debate 
 
The larger part of the literature on rising inequality has been concerned with changes in 
personal income distribution. Functional income distribution has received comparably less 
attention, but, recently several high profile studies have appeared, for example IMF (2007a) in 
the World Economic Outlook, and in ILO’s (2011) World of Work Report. This section will 
provide the theoretical background for the empirical analysis by summarizing the key 
arguments in the debate on income distribution, highlighting technological change, 
globalisation, financialisation and welfare state retrenchment. It will also survey the studies 
that are closely related to our own research design, i.e. that explain changes in the wage share 
over time and across countries in a panel analysis. 
 
3.1 Neoclassical approaches and technological change 
The core of neoclassical theory of income distribution is that technological change is the main 
determinant of changes in distribution. The basic argument is set in a world of complete 
markets, perfect competition, full employment and well behaved aggregate production 
functions and modern neoclassical theory allows for deviations from this. The modern version 
of this argument is that since the early 1980s technological change has been skill biased. In 
particular, information and communication technology (ICT) is viewed as complementary to 
skilled labour and a substitute for unskilled labour. Thus, there has been a shift in income 
distribution towards skilled labour. This hypothesis has motivated a substantial number of 
empirical studies, in particular for the USA, where it was used to explain the sharp increase in 
personal income inequality (Autor et al 1999, Card and Di Nardo 2002).  
 
Technological change is also used to explain changes in functional income distribution. 
Technological change, according to this story, has become capital augmenting rather than 
labour augmenting. Consequently, wage shares have fallen (IMF 2007a, EC 2007). This does 
not follow from skill-biased technological change, but is consistent with it. As the use of ICT 
capital increased, the demand for high-skilled labour increased and that of low-skilled labour 
decreased, which came with rising wages for high-skilled workers and falling wages for low-
skilled workers. Only with specific assumptions about the labour demand elasticities of 
skilled and unskilled labour, will it result in a declining wage share (EC2007).  
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IMF (2007a) is probably the most prominent mainstream analysis of changes in functional 
income distribution. It uses a panel of 18 OECD countries with annual data for the period 
1983-2002 to analyze the effects of globalisation, changes in technology, and labour market 
institutions. The study is careful in discussing the effects of globalisation, with indicators for 
offshoring, relative import and export prices and immigration. The ICT capital stock and the 
capital-labour ratio are used as technology variables. It includes union density and the tax 
wedge as labour market institutions. IMF (2007a) concludes that “globalization is one of 
several factors that have acted to reduce the share of income accruing to labour in advanced 
economies, although rapid technological change has had a bigger impact” (IMF 2007a, 161). 
EC (2007) is based on a panel of annual data for 13 OECD countries from 1983 to 2002. It is 
similar in spirit to IMF (2007a), but its focus is on the effects on different skill levels. EC 
(2007) finds that the capital-labour ratio has a positive effect. ICT services (per employee) has 
no statistically significant effect. Openness has a negative effect and significant effects for 
some labour market institutions variables.  
 
The preferred variable for skill-biased technological change is the use of ICT capital or ICT 
services. In the context of developing economies GDP per capita is usually used as a proxy. In 
addition, variables measuring structural change such as the agricultural share have been used.  
 
3.2 Globalisation, classical trade theory and the Political Economy 
approach 
Globalisation features prominently in political debates as well as in economic analysis, but 
there are important theoretical differences. Classical trade theory as expressed in the Stolper 
and Samuelson (1941) theorem states that the abundant factor will gain from international 
trade. Globalisation is thus supposed to benefit capital in the advanced and labour in the 
developing economies. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem assumes full employment and that 
neither capital nor labour is mobile. However, the recent period of globalisation has been 
marked by an increase in capital mobility. But “if capital can travel across borders, the 
implications of the theorem weaken substantially” (EC 2007, 45). Despite these limitations 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem has a firm place in the mainstream economics canon and it is 
often used to argue that globalisation will hurt workers in the advanced economies and benefit 
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workers in developing economies.
4
 However, the evidence supports only half of the Stolper-
Samuelson argument: While workers in advanced economies have indeed lost out, those in 
developing countries seem to have lost as well (see Section 2).  
 
The Political Economy of globalisation approach argues that the main effect of trade on 
income distribution is not via relative prices, but through affecting the bargaining position of 
labour and capital (Rodrik 1997, Onaran 2011). Globalisation increases the strategic options 
of capital by allowing it to relocate production; Rodrik (1997) thus argues that trade 
liberalization benefits the more mobile factor, which will typically be capital. Unlike in the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the change in distribution takes place because of a redistribution 
of rents, not because of the equalisation of factor costs. In contrast to classical trade theory 
this approach predicts, first, that labour will lose in advanced as well as in developing 
economies and, second, that trade or FDI flows among similar countries will affect income 
distribution. 
 
Harrison (2002), Jayadev (2007), and ILO (2011) analyse the determinants of functional 
income distribution in advanced as well as developing countries. Harrison (2002) investigates 
the effects of globalisation in an analysis covering more than 100 countries 1960-97. 
Openness, capital controls, the terms of trade and exchange rate crises are used as variables 
for globalisation. The estimations also control for the capital-labour ratio, relative per capita 
GDP and the government share in GDP. Harrison finds that the capital-labour ratio has a 
strong (positive) impact and globalisation has had negative effects on distribution. Capital 
controls have a positive effect. Openness, exchange rate crises and FDI-inflows have negative 
effects on the wage share. Jayadev (2007) analyses the effect of financial openness and trade 
openness on the wage share covering up to 80 countries for the period 1970-2001. The 
openness variables are legal measures on openness. Control variables include (in various 
specifications) per capita GDP, interest rates, a crisis dummy, the government share and the 
budget deficit. Capital account openness and trade openness are found to have negative 
effects on the wage share. ILO (2011) reports estimates for developing countries by regional 
                                                 
4
 An important area of research has been the introduction of heterogeneous labour into trade models. These 
models use labour with different skill-levels and allow for intermediate goods (Feenstra and Hanson 1997, 
1999). These types of models are designed to analyse the effect of outsourcing on different groups of labour, but 
the effect on the total wage share is less clear. 
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group, but no full panel. Explanatory variables include trade openness, financial globalisation, 
capital account openness, unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation, 
minimum wages, GDP per capital, real interest rates and a crisis dummy. The discussion 
highlights that financialisation and trade openness has reduced the bargaining power of 
labour. 
 
In empirical research trade openness, i.e. imports plus exports relative to GDP, is the most 
commonly used indicator for globalisation (used e.g. by EC 2007, Rodrik 1997, Harrison 
2002). IMF (2007a) offers several measures of globalisation including the terms of trade and 
measures of offshoring and immigration. Harrison (2002) and Rodrik (1998) also use 
measures of capital account liberalisation. 
 
3.3 Welfare state retrenchment and the bargaining power of labour 
The analysis of welfare states has long held a prominent place in political science. The extent 
and nature of welfare state retrenchment has been subject to debate (Pierson 1994, Korpi and 
Palme, 2003). While aggregate social expenditures may still be high by historical standards, 
there has been a reduction in welfare state generosity and a shift towards private provision of 
social services. The power resources theory was developed in the analysis of welfare states 
(O’Connor and Olsen 1998), but it has recently also been used to explain changes in income 
distribution (Kristal 2010, Bengtsson 2014). It regards income distribution as determined by 
the relative power positions of labour and capital.
5
 Kristal (2010) distinguishes between the 
organisational, political, and structural dimensions of power. In the empirical analysis union 
density and unemployment benefits play key roles, but she also includes strikes activity, left 
governments and broader measures of social expenditures and finds positive effects. 
 
Similar issues do surface in the mainstream economic approach, but with a different twist. 
First, higher bargaining power of workers will lead to an increase in wages, but it will only 
increase the wage share, if labour demand is inelastic. Second, in empirical research 
economists tend to identify the welfare state with labour market institutions (LMI), the 
                                                 
5
 The literature focuses on the bargaining power of labour. The bargaining power or, more narrowly, the market 
power of firms is an under researched topic. Globalisation ought to have decreased the market power of firms by 
means of the entrance of new competitors. At the same time it has increased the bargaining power of firms vis-a-
vis labour (as discussed above). Azmat, Manning and van Reenen (2007) and Hutchinson and Persyn (2009) are 
among the exceptions that analyse the bargaining power of firms in sectoral studies. 
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measures of which are designed to measure labour market inflexibility rather than genuine 
bargaining power.  
 
There are three relevant studies from the political and social sciences. Kristal (2010) estimates 
a wage share equation for 16 OECD countries 1960-2005 by means of panel ECM and uses 
union density and strike activity as variables for organisational power, government civilian 
spending and left governments for political power and southern imports and FDI for structural 
power. She finds that the variables have the expected signs, but some have short-term effects 
and others long-term ones. Hancké (2012) focuses on the interaction of the monetary policy 
regime and the collective bargaining structure. He estimates a panel of 14 OECD countries 
1973-99 by means of a difference estimator and finds that collective bargaining coordination 
in interaction with conservative central banks has a negative effect on the wage share, with 
insignificant effects of union density and left governments. Bengtsson (2014) takes a power 
resources approach, focussing on the role of labour unions. He uses a panel ECM model (with 
fixed effects) for a panel of 16 OECD countries (1960-2007). He controls for productivity 
growth, unemployment benefits, social expenditures, openness, growth, and agricultural 
employment and finds robust effects for union density. All three studies deal with advanced 
economies and none of them controls for financialisation.  
 
For developing economies little comparative work on the welfare state exists. The studies that 
also cover developing economies have used the government share in GDP (Harrison 2002, 
Jayadev 2007). However, this measure is problematic for econometric reasons. Government 
consumption consists of the wages of government employees and is thus by definition related 
to the wage share, leading to endogeneity problems. 
 
3.4 Financialisation 
An increased role of financial activity and rising prominence of financial institutions is a 
hallmark of the transformations of economy and society since the mid 1970s. These changes 
are often referred to as financialisation which are based on the deregulation of financial 
markets and international capital flows and have resulted at the macroeconomic level in more 
volatile exchange rates and asset prices and higher leverage ratio, but it has also affected how 
non-financial firms conduct their business (Ertürk et al 2008, Stockhammer 2013). Köhler  et 
al (2015) distinguish four channels by which financialisation may affect income distribution 
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First, firms have gained more exit options: they can invest in financial assets as well as in real 
assets. Stockhammer (2004) and Krippner (2005) document that non-financial businesses are 
increasingly active on financial markets and in many countries receive half their operating 
surplus from financial transactions. Thompson (2003) argues that this makes them less likely 
to strike a deal with labour at the shopfloor level. Second, it has empowered shareholders and 
rentiers to extract a bigger share of corporate profits in the form of interest and dividend 
payments. To the extent that financial overheads increase firms are likely to put pressure on 
wages. Third, financialisation may have increased competitive pressures on capital markets 
and established a market for corporate control. This has encourged firms to pursue 
shareholder value as their primary goal, which has shifted firms priorities from growth to 
profitiability (Stockhammer 2004) or involves share buybacks to increase asset prices. 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue that has led firms to adopt a ‘downsize and distribute’ 
strategy. Firms that do not comply will be subject to takeovers and leveraged buyouts. 
Applebaum et al (2013) present case studies of private equity buyouts and their effects on 
labour relations. Forth, the financialisation of households may have undermined working class 
identities and thereby weakened the strength of organised labour. 
 
However, most panel studies on changes in functional income distribution in OECD countries 
have not included financialisation variables. Stockhammer (2009) and Dünhaupt (2013) are 
the exceptions, but cover only advanced economies. Stockhammer uses financial globalisation 
and interest rates as variables for financialisation and controls for ICT services, the capital 
labour ratio, various LMI, union density and openness in a panel for 15 OECD economies, 
1982-2003. He, firstly, estimates a specification similar to those of IMF (2007a) and EC 
(2007) and finds that their findings regarding the role of technology are not robust. Secondly, 
the estimated wage share equation is extended to allow for distributional effects of financial 
globalisation and for different effects of union density according to social security system. 
Results from the extended model suggest economically significant effects of financial 
globalisation and of union density. Dünhaupt (2013) uses interest and dividend payments as 
proxies for financialisation, controlling for union density, strikes, government expenditures, 
openness, FDI and import prices (with no technology controls) in a panel of 13 OECD 
countries 1986-2007. She finds statistically significant effects for financialisation and 
globalisation. Rodrik (1998) and Harrison (2002) have included measures of capital controls 
and capital mobility.  
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3.5 Comments on the literature 
There is a sizeable, but uneven empirical literature on the determinants of changes in 
functional income distribution, which can usefully be grouped into those inspired by modern 
neoclassical theory and Political Economy approaches on globalisation, welfare state 
retrenchment and financialisation. While the literature on the Political Economy approaches 
has originated from different disciplines and highlighted different causes, it shares a common 
ground in regarding income distribution as determined by power relations. This contrasts to 
the neoclassical approach that regards distribution as ultimately determined by market forces 
of price equilibration.  
 
IMF (2007a) and EC (2007) are the most prominent representations of the neoclassical view. 
They both identify technological change as the single most important factor and acknowledge 
that globalisation has had a negative impact on the wage share. The prominence given to 
technological change seems to be driven by theoretical priors. IMF (2007b) notes that the 
effects of technology are not robust to the inclusion of time effects. EC (2007) finds that ICT 
services, the preferred variable of technological change in IMF (2007a), has no statistically 
significant effect.  
 
Next to all studies find substantial effects of globalisation on functional income distribution. 
Nonetheless, there is a potential confusion around the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem is part of the conventional wisdom of mainstream economics, 
even though it is widely acknowledged that its assumptions are simplistic. The finding, that 
for advanced economies there is a negative effect of globalisation on the wage share, is then 
easily read as support for the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Challenging the neoclassical view, 
the findings of Harrison (2002), Rodrik (1998) and Jayadev (2007) show that increased trade 
has a negative effect on the wage share in developing as well as in advanced economies which 
contradicts the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.  
 
While most studies try to control for some measure of globalisation and technology, only few 
studies allow for an effect of financialisation on functional income distribution. In the case of 
mainstream economics this is perhaps surprising as IMF (2007b) has found to that it has an 
effect on personal income distribution. Stockhammer (2009) and Dünhaupt (2013) do find 
effects for advanced economies and Jayadev (2007) includes a measure of capital account 
openness. 
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Most studies cover only advanced economies. Only those studies discussed under the heading 
Political Economy of globalisation also report results for developing economies. The studies 
for advanced economies all use the adjusted wage share as dependent variable, while the 
studies covering advanced as well as developing economies use un-adjusted wage shares. This 
is presumably because of data availability issues. However, the adjustment is more important 
for developing countries than for advanced countries as the informal sector tends to be larger.  
 
Among the studies cited only Bengtsson (2013) has been published in an Industrial 
Relations/Human Resources Management journal. Research in these journals typically 
focuses on the micro or meso level and considers specific sectors, firm characteristics, union 
strategies, and institutional determinants such as minimum wages. Compared to that our 
approach highlights more macro economic factors that impact on management strategies and 
workers‘ bargaining position. However, all of the themes that are important for our argument 
have, from a different angle, also featured in the industrial relations literature. In particular the 
role and organisational strength of trade unions has received a lot of attention, however, it is 
typically used to explain the differences in wages between unionised versus non-unionised 
workers, e.g. Freeman and Medoff (1984). More recently, Leslie and Pu (1996) use union 
density to explain changes in personal income inequality in Britain over time and Pontussen 
(2013) to explain changes in inequality across countries. The effects of globalisation on wages 
have featured prominently in international economics (e.g. Geishecker and Gorg 2008), where 
it has been used to explain differences in wages on between skilled and unskilled workers. In 
industrial relations there have been various sector-specific studies on the effects on wages, 
employment (Gomez et al 2013 on Canadian business services) and worker morale (e.g. 
McCann 2014 on UK banking and insurance), but there is little research on the overall 
distribution of income in the economy. Boulhol et al (2011) provide evidence for UK 
manufacturing that imports from developing countries reduces mark ups as well as workers‘ 
bargaining power. Technological change and computer use in particular have long been used 
to explain individual earnings (e.g. Dolton and Pelkonen 2008 for the UK) and the size of the 
union wage premium (Betcherman 1991 for Canadian blue collar workers). Financialisation, a 
key factor in our study, is recently meeting growing interest in industrial relations research. 
Thompson (2003) argues that financial constraints have kept firms from establishing high-
road employment relationships. Gospel and Pendleton (2003) systematically analyse the 
impact of financial systems on corporate governance and labour relations based on a varieties 
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of capitalism framework. Applebaum et al (2013) present four case studies of private equity-
led restructuring of firms. Palpacuer et al (2011) argue that even in a coordinated market 
economy like France HRM for skilled employees has been affected by financialisation.  
 
4 Estimation equation, data sources, and econometric 
methodology 
 
We estimate the private sector adjusted wage share (WSAP) as a function of variables 
measuring growth, technological change (tech), globalisation (glob), financialisation (fin) and 
welfare state retrenchment (wfst): 
 
),,,,( wfstfinglobtechgrowthfWSAP         (1) 
 
This is a synthetic equation that incorporates the key arguments of the debate. It is based on a 
Political Economy approach, but our analysis encompasses the neoclassical approach (such as 
IMF 2007a and EC 2007). Welfare state retrenchment as well as globalisation and 
financialisation affect the bargaining power of capital and labour. Our approach is consistent 
with what we have labelled the Political Economy of globalisation and the Power Resources 
theory, which regards income distribution as the outcome of bargaining processes rather than 
a market clearing process, but we have a stronger emphasis on the effects of financialisation. 
We do control for growth as a business cycle variable as the wage share tends to have 
counter-cyclical pattern. 
 
Filling these categories with empirical data raises conceptual as well as practical issues. 
Conceptually, there may be no clear cut distinction between the different determinants. For 
example without the development of modern communication technologies international 
production networks would not be feasible. Thus technological change and globalisation may 
depend on one another. An important practical issue is that including additional variables 
typically implies losing observations due to missing data. We have to tread a fine balance 
between using the best variables available and keeping sample size as large as possible.  
 
In the baseline specification, technological change will be proxied by GDP per worker, and, 
additionally by the agricultural share and the industrial employment share; for the welfare 
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state we use the government consumption; for globalisation we use trade openness; for 
financialization financial globalisation. The baseline specification, however, is ultimately 
arbitrary as there are several candidates for variables that could have been included. It is the 
result of pre-testing and includes variables that have proven robust. We will report various 
specifications to check the robustness of the results. 
 
Our dependent variable is the private, adjusted wage share (WSAP). The wage share is the 
share of wages in national income. Two adjustments are made to the wage share. First, there 
is an adjustment that imputes wage payments for self-employed workers. This is particularly 
important for developing countries where a large part of the population is self employed. The 
adjusted wage share imputes wage payments for the self-employed to avoid counting all their 
income as profit income (Krueger 1999, Gollin 2002). This adjustment is standard in the 
literature and we directly use adjusted data from ILO/IILS and other sources. 
 
The second adjustment transforms the wage share for the total economy into the private wage 
share. This is because our measure for the welfare state will be the size of government 
consumption. However, the wage share in government consumption is a hundred percent as 
the public sector does not generate profits. Government consumption is thus by definition 
related to the wage share and would lead to endogeneity problems in the regression analysis. 
The wage share of the total economy is the sum of the private wage share (WS
P
) and the 
government wage share (WS
G
) weighted by their respective sizes. We use government 
consumption (CG) as percent of GDP as measure for the size of the government sector: 
WS = (1- CG)*WS
P
 + CG*WS
G
 
As the wage share in the government sector is equal to 1, we can reconstruct the private wage 
share as WS
P
 = (WS-CG)/(1-CG). 
 
We employ several sources for the adjusted wage share (WSA). Our primary source is the 
ILO/IILS database (compiled by Matthieu Charpe). As the AMECO database, the OECD, and 
some national statistics provide longer series for certain countries we complement the 
ILO/IILS series with data from these alternative sources. For the EU15 member states and 
Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States we use series from the AMECO database. For 
Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey we employ data from the OECD. For China we use a 
national series.  
 
16 
The following variables are used in the baseline specification for developing and advanced 
economies: Growth (GROWTH) is real GDP growth (in national currency) taken from the 
World Bank WDI. Financial globalisation (FINGLOB) is the logarithm of external assets plus 
external liabilities divided by GDP, taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). This is a 
broad measure of financialisation that counts foreign financial assets and liabilities of all 
sectors and is often used to measure the degree of integration of a country into (or the 
exposure to) the international financial system. Trade openness (OPEN) is measured as 
exports plus imports divided by GDP, taken from the World Bank WDI. Government 
consumption as percentage of GDP (CG) is taken from the PENN World Tables 7.0. The 
logarithm of the PPP converted GDP per worker at constant prices (GDPPW), taken from the 
Penn World Tables, is used as a measure of technological change. Structural change in 
developing countries is operationalised with the variables for agricultural share (AG), that is 
the value added by forestry, hunting, fishing, the cultivation of crops, and livestock 
production as a percentage of GDP, and industry share (IND), which stands for value added in 
mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas as a percentage of GDP. AG 
and IND are taken from the World Bank WDI dataset.  
 
For the baseline variables we get an unbalanced panel that includes up to 71 countries for a 
maximum period of 1970 to 2007. However, for most developing countries the series are 
much shorter than that. The common sample covers up to 2191 observations of which 864 
advanced and 599 developing countries. Descriptive statistics and correlations are 
summarised in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
In extensions of the baseline variables, the following variables will be included. These 
additional variables will, at times substantially, reduce the sample. TOT stands for terms of 
trade and has been put together from the AMECO database (for advanced countries) and for 
developing countries according to availability the IMF IFS (export unit values/import unit 
values) or the World Bank WDI (net barter terms of trade index). These series are not strictly 
comparable across countries and TOT is therefore not included in the set of baseline variables. 
UNEMPL is the number of unemployed people as a share of the labour force. For the member 
states of the EU(15), Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Turkey and the United 
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States data from the AMECO database is used. For other countries unemployment data from 
the ILO database on labour statistics, the IMF or the World Bank WDI dataset is employed, 
depending on which dataset has the longest time series. ICT_CB is the logarithm of ICT assets 
divided by GDP taken from the Conference Board Total Economy Database. Furthermore, the 
impact of severe economic crises is tested using dummy variables for crisis years (defined as 
a real GDP growth of less than -3 percent) and for exchange rate crisis (defined as a nominal 
devaluation of more than 20% vis-a-vis the dollar). The impact of financial reforms is 
investigated with a dataset from Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) which reports the 
financial reform index (FINREF_XN) is a summary index for financial reforms.  
 
In a variation for advanced economies technological change is measured by the capital-labour 
ratio (KL_KLEMS), which is the logarithm of capital services divided by the number of 
persons engaged, and ICT services (ICT_KLEMS), which is the logarithm of ICT capital 
services divided by gross value added. Both variables are from the EU KLEMS dataset. 
Union density (UNION) is from Bassanini and Duval (2006) and Baker et al (2005).  
 
The impact of labour market institutions on the wage share is measured with variables from 
Aleksynska and Schindler (2011) which account for the ratio of minimum wage to mean wage 
(MW_MNW), the gross replacement rate (UB_GRR1), the unemployment benefits coverage 
(UB_COVERAGE), the advance notice period after 4 years (EPL_AN4Y), and the severance 
pay after 4 years (EPL_SP4Y). As labour supply variables we use the logarithm of the number 
of economically active people (LF), taken from the World Bank WDI dataset, and the 
logarithm of the population (POP), retrieved from the Penn World Tables 7.0 
 
Panel analysis requires the assumption that a change in a variable has the same marginal 
effect in different countries. This is a strong assumption. However, the number of variables 
that we wish to investigate and the fact that for many developing economies we have short 
samples, prohibit analysis of each country individually. Certainly our data do not allow to 
investigate for each country individually the dynamic adjustments that play a prominent role 
in time series econometrics. Therefore panel analysis is used. The coefficient estimates of the 
panel analysis, however, have to be interpreted with caution as the pooling restriction (i.e. the 
assumption of identical coefficients across countries) is likely to hold only as an 
approximation in our sample. The coefficient estimates have to be interpreted as average 
effects across a group of possibly heterogeneous countries.  
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Our preferred specification is a standard fixed effects (FE) estimator most frequently used in 
the literature (e.g. IMF 2007a, EC 2007, Jayadev 2007). We use cross section fixed effects, an 
autocorrelation correction and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. This is also called 
the Parks estimator (Beck and Katz 1995, Wooldridge 2002). Unless otherwise noted, results 
will refer to this specification. Panel unit root tests reject the hypothesis of a common unit 
root of WSAP at the 1% level. The tests that allow for individual unit roots reject the null of a 
unit root at the 10% level. 
 
5 Econometric results  
 
The baseline specification is: 
 
WSAPt,j = β1GROWTHt,j +  β2 FINGLOBt,j + β3OPENt,j + β4CGt,j + β5GDPPWt,j + β6AGt,j + 
β7INDt,j + β8αj + εt,j 
 
Where WSAP is the adjusted private wage share, growth the real GDP growth, FINGLOB (the 
logarithm of) financial globalisation, OPEN trade openness, CG government consumption, 
GDPPW (the logarithm of) GDP per worker, AG the agricultural share, IND the industrial 
share.  
 
Table 3 presents our baseline specification and some extensions. Specification 1 is the 
baseline specification. For our baseline variables the results are very similar in the different 
specifications. FINGLOB consistently has a statistically significant negative effect (at the 1% 
level) in all specifications (except specification 9). OPEN has a statistically significant 
negative effect in all specifications (at the 1% or the 5% level). CG has a positive effect (at 
the 5% level) in all specifications except for specifications 6 and 7. GDPPW only has a 
statistically significant negative effect (at the 10% level) in specification 5. AG has a 
statistically significant negative effect (at the 1% level) in all specifications except 
specification 4. IND has a statistically significant negative effect (at the 1% or 5% level) in all 
specifications. This is probably due to the fact that manufacturing sectors have a high capital 
intensity and thus require higher profit shares to maintain their capital stock. 
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[Table 3 around here] 
 
GROWTH has a statistically significant negative effect in all specifications in Table 1. This is 
the case in practically all specifications to be presented later. Presumably, this reflects the fact 
that, in the short run, prices are more flexible than wages. GROWTH is included in all 
specifications as a short-run variable. As the study is interested in medium term developments 
and for our time period growth performance has been rather stable, we will not discuss this 
variable further. 
 
Specification 2 interacts OPEN with a dummy variable for high income countries. This is to 
test whether globalisation has a different effect in advanced and in developing economies as 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem suggests. We find no statistically significant effect. 
Specification 3 interacts FINGLOB with the high income dummy. Again we find no 
statistically significant effect. This suggests that the effects of globalisation as well as the 
financialisation do not differ systematically between advanced and developing countries. 
Specification 4 includes TOT, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Specification 5 
includes a variable for unemployment. This has a statistically significant negative effect. 
Specification 6 includes a variable measuring the ICT services. This reduces the sample 
substantially as the variable is only available from 1990. We find no statistically significant 
effect, which is at odds with skill-biased technological change being the key driver of income 
distribution. Specifications 7 and 8 include dummy variables for crisis years (defined as a 
negative real GDP growth rate) and for exchange rate crisis (defined as a nominal devaluation 
of more than 20% vis-a-vis the dollar). We find no statistically significant effect of the crisis 
dummy and we do find a statistically significant effect of exchange rate crises. Specification 9 
reports results for specifications including summary index of financial reform from Abiad et 
al (2008). This variable is found to have statistically significant negative effect, which 
confirms the effect of financialisation. The effect of FINGLOB is robust to the inclusion of 
FINREF_XN, We conclude that the effects of our baseline variables are robust. 
 
Table 4 reports the results by income groups. The sample sizes of the different income groups 
differ substantially, with upper middle income and high income groups being much larger 
(and therefore more reliable). For low-income countries (with only 50 observations!) we find 
a positive effect (at the 10% level) of OPEN and negative ones of CG and of AG (both at the 
10% level). For the other country groups we find consistent results: negative effects of 
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FINGLOB (statistically significant at the 1% level in upper middle and high income 
countries), negative effects of OPEN (at the 10% level for low middle income countries and at 
the 1% level for upper middle and high income countries); a positive effect of CG (at the 5% 
level or better); for GDPPW positive effects in low and middle income countries; negative 
effects of AG (at the 5% level for upper middle income and high income countries); negative 
effects of IND (at the 1% level at upper middle and high income countries), but statistically 
significant positive effects for low middle income countries. Our results thus seem to be 
driven by the upper middle and high income countries that make up most of our sample. The 
results are qualitatively very similar for lower middle income countries, but weaker in terms 
of statistical significance. However, it is not clear whether our baseline results also hold for 
low income countries, but this may simply be due to the small sample size for these countries. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
To compare our results with those of IMF (2007a) and EC (2007) specification (6) reports a 
specification for advanced economies that includes ICT_KLEMS, KL_KLEMS, UNION and 
TOT which are not available for developing countries. This reduces the sample to 480 
observations. We find that the effects for FINGLOB, OPEN, CG are robust. KL_KLEMS, 
UNION and TOT do have statistically significant effects, where ICT_KLEMS does not. 
 
Table 5 present the results for the baseline specification with four different estimation 
methods to check the robustness of results. The second specification will be a first-difference 
estimator. This estimator should theoretically yield similar results to the fixed effects 
estimator and is preferable if the regression suffers from a high degree of autocorrelation in 
the residuals (Wooldridge 2002, 284). We report panel corrected standard errors that are 
consistent to heteroscedasticity. It turns out that the FE estimator and the difference estimator 
mostly yield very similar results. Thirdly we present medium-run results based on non-
overlapping 5-year average data. This is often regarded as appropriate when institutional 
variables are involved that do not change on a year-to-year basis. However, this approach 
comes at the cost of losing some information. Fourthly, we estimate a GMM estimator based 
on Arellano and Bond (1991). This is a dynamic panel estimator that instruments the lagged 
dependent variable. While presently fashionable in the literature, the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) estimator and the Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator have been developed for panels 
that have much larger cross sections than ours. Instrumental variable estimators do not have 
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good small sample properties. The GMM estimator therefore cannot be presumed to be 
superior in our context.  
 
Specification 1 reports the estimation results of the fixed effects estimator in levels. 
Specification 2 reports the results in first differences, specification 3 the results with non-
overlapping five year averages, and specification 4 the GMM results. For the most part, the 
results are rather similar. FINGLOB has a statistically significant effect (at the 1% level) in all 
specifications. OPEN has statistically significant, negative effect in specifications 1 and 2 
(and at the 10% level in specification 3), but no statistically significant effect in specification 
4. CG has a statistically significant positive effect in specifications 1 and 2, no statistically 
significant effect in specification 3 and no statistically significant effect in specification 4. 
Among the technology variables GDPPW has a statistically significant, positive effect in 
specification 2; AG has a statistically significant negative effect in specifications 1 and 2 (but 
none in specifications 3 and 4); IND has a statistically significant negative effect in 
specifications 1, 2 and 4.
6
  
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
 
Table 6 reports results for specifications including labour market institution data from 
Aleksynska and Schindler (2011). Specification 2 includes the ratio of minimum to mean 
wages, specification 3 the unemployment benefit gross replacement rate (at one year of 
unemployment), specification 4 the unemployment benefit coverage ratio, specification 5 the 
employment protection legislation/advance notice (after four years of work) and specification 
6 the employment protection legislation/severance pay (after four years of work). 
Specifications 7 and 8 include the labour force and population as labour supply measures. 
Surprisingly, none of these variables has a statistically significant effect. The sample sizes get 
reduced due to the inclusion of these variables, but are still quite large. We have also 
experimented with specifications including the unemployment rate, estimations for all 
countries and for developing economies separately and with different estimation methods. 
The conclusion is the same: we are unable to find reliable effects of the labour market 
                                                 
6
 The GMM results turn out to be very sensitive to the lag length in the instruments. The results reported do thus 
not impose a restriction on the lag length. 
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institutions on the wage share. This is consistent with two interpretations: either bargaining 
power of labour was not a driver of changes in income distribution or the LMI variables are 
poor indicators of the bargaining position of labour. 
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
To illustrate the relative size of effects implied in our estimation results, Figure 3 presents the 
contributions of financialisation, globalisation, welfare state retrenchment and technological 
change to changes in wage shares from 1990/94-2000/04. The impact of financialisation is 
proxied by FINGLOB, globalisation by OPEN, welfare state by CG and technological and 
structural change by GDPPW, AG and IND. The contribution of GROWTH, which was 
included as short-term variable, is approximately zero and is therefore omitted in the 
presentation. The contributions of different factors are calculated as the coefficient estimate 
multiplied with the change in the respective underlying variable. These calculations are 
carried out for a hypothetical average country, i.e. they are based on the mean of the 
respective variables across countries. Figure 3 shows that in this decade financialisation has 
had the largest impact on the adjusted, private wage share, explaining about 1.5 percentage 
points. Globalisation and welfare state retrenchment have each contributed about a half 
percentage point reduction in the wage share. Technological change, broadly defined to 
include structural change, has had a positive contribution to the wage share of about three 
quarters of a percentage point. 
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
The picture looks very similar when looking at developing countries only (Figure 4): 
financialisation has had the largest negative impact, explaining more than half of the total 
change of the wage share. Globalisation and welfare state retrenchment have had more 
modest negative effects. Technological and structural change has had a positive effect on the 
wage share in developing economies from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. The positive 
effects stems from the structural component, that is agricultural and industrial share, whereas 
GDP per worker has had minor negative impact on the wage share. 
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
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6 Conclusion  
 
Functional income distribution has changed substantially in the course of the last three 
decades. Wage shares have declined in all OECD countries and most developing economies. 
This is part of a broader trend towards greater social inequality. This paper has investigated 
the relative impact of financialisation, globalisation, welfare state retrenchment and 
technological change on functional income distribution based on a dataset covering up to 71 
countries (28 advanced and 43 developing and emerging economies) from 1970 to 2007.  
 
Our results refute two widely held views about income distribution. First the view that 
changes in income distribution have mainly been driven by technological change is not 
supported by our findings. While we find non-trivial effects of technological change, they are 
comparatively small. Second, the Stolper-Samuelson prediction that globalisation would 
benefit workers in developing and emerging economies does not hold empirically in the past 
thirty years. We fail to find statistically significant differences of the effects in advanced and 
developing economies and we find an overall negative contribution of globalisation on wage 
shares in developing economies. . 
 
We find that financialisation has had the largest contribution to the decline of the wage share. 
Globalisation has also had substantial effects (in advanced as well as in developing 
economies). Welfare state retrenchment has also contributed to the changes in distribution, 
but has had a smaller effect. Overall our results support a Political Economy approach to 
explaining changes in income distribution. Factors affecting the bargaining position of labour 
and capital play a larger role than technological change. Compared to the literature inspired 
by the power resources theory, our findings highlight that trade policies and financial 
regulation may have a bigger effect on income distribution than labour relations. 
 
Our main finding is that the existing literature on changes in income distribution may have 
overlooked a very important factor: financialisation. Our financialisation variable, however, is 
a rather crude one. Future research should take into account financial factors and it should 
develop a more detailed analysis of the mechanisms by which it affects income distribution. 
This will require microeconomic and case study work as well as macroeconomic analysis.  
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8 Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for baseline variables 
 
full sample 
OECD 
countries 
 
devloping 
countries 
 
 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
 Std. 
Dev. 
WSAP 58.314 16.007 63.204 7.495 48.792 20.677 
GROWTH 0.035 0.032 0.030 0.023 0.041 0.042 
LOG(FINGLOB) 0.204 0.986 0.383 1.070 -0.030 0.781 
OPEN 0.726 0.457 0.705 0.424 0.741 0.505 
LOG(GDPPW) 10.188 0.948 10.799 0.318 9.263 0.826 
CG 9.289 3.255 9.835 2.455 8.642 4.217 
AG 9.280 9.369 4.982 3.821 15.756 11.335 
IND 31.480 7.146 31.761 5.485 31.175 9.282 
       Observations 1463 
 
864 
 
599 
 Note. WSAP: adjusted private-sector wage share; GROWTH: growth of real GDP; 
FINGLOB: financial globalisation; OPEN: openness; GDPPW: GDP per worker; CG: 
government consumption as share of GDP; AG: agricultural employment share; IND: 
industrial employment share; OECD countries: high-income OECD countries; developing 
countries: low and medium income countries. 
 
Table 2. Correlation of baseline variables 
correlations 
       
 
WSAP GROWTH LOG(FINGLOB) OPEN LOG(GDPPW) CG AG IND 
WSAP 1.000 -0.067 -0.018 -0.058 0.416 0.021 -0.353 0.128 
GROWTH -0.067 1.000 -0.076 0.082 -0.190 -0.040 0.153 0.165 
LOG(FINGLOB) -0.018 -0.076 1.000 0.681 0.360 -0.026 -0.376 -0.347 
OPEN -0.058 0.082 0.681 1.000 0.103 0.083 -0.182 -0.205 
LOG(GDPPW) 0.416 -0.190 0.360 0.103 1.000 0.037 -0.855 0.118 
CG 0.021 -0.040 -0.026 0.083 0.037 1.000 -0.062 0.120 
AG -0.353 0.153 -0.376 -0.182 -0.855 -0.062 1.000 -0.245 
IND 0.128 0.165 -0.347 -0.205 0.118 0.120 -0.245 1.000 
Note: WSAP: adjusted private-sector wage share; GROWTH: growth of real GDP; 
FINGLOB: financial globalisation; OPEN: openness; GDPPW: GDP per worker; CG: 
government consumption as share of GDP; AG: agricultural employment share; IND: 
industrial employment share;.  
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Table 3. Results for the baseline specification and variations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GROWTH -11.936 -11.97 -12.32 -11.193 -11.603 -16.086 -9.913 -13.976 -12.137 
t-value -4.167*** -4.172*** -4.254*** -3.774*** -3.872*** -3.007*** -3.310*** -4.803*** -4.083*** 
LOG(FINGLOB) -3.659 -3.677 -4.384 -3.046 -3.556 -2.551 -3.729 -3.251 -3.42 
t-value -6.997*** -6.932*** -5.258*** -5.141*** -7.017*** -2.554** -7.049*** -5.623*** -6.125*** 
OPEN -3.811 -4.02 -3.821 -6.225 -3.561 -5.775 -3.898 -3.913 -5.027 
t-value -3.211*** -2.540** -3.191*** -4.436*** -2.869*** -2.595*** -3.306*** -3.141*** -3.675*** 
LOG(GDPPW) -0.658 -0.667 -1.155 -2.364 -4.098 -2.834 -0.62 -0.829 -2.512 
t-value -0.321 -0.325 -0.568 -1.138 -1.786* -0.616 -0.307 -0.396 -1.217 
CG 0.801 0.801 0.804 0.392 0.954 -0.049 0.824 0.731 0.67 
t-value 3.975*** 3.972*** 3.995*** 2.052** 4.210*** -0.169 4.154*** 3.490*** 3.415*** 
AG -0.235 -0.236 -0.228 -0.139 -0.342 -0.421 -0.237 -0.235 -0.277 
t-value -2.719*** -2.721*** -2.621*** -1.338 -3.700*** -2.195** -2.744*** -2.683*** -2.672*** 
IND -0.159 -0.158 -0.146 -0.261 -0.183 -0.339 -0.162 -0.152 -0.174 
t-value -2.457** -2.457** -2.208** -3.697*** -2.731*** -2.861*** -2.524** -2.324** -2.360** 
OPEN*D_OECD 0.513         
t-value  0.248        
LOG(FINGLOB)*D_OECD  1.238        
t-value   1.228       
TOT    -4.22      
t-value    -3.253***      
UNEMPL    -0.315      
t-value     -4.743***     
LOG(ICT_CB)      0.26    
t-value      0.159    
D_CRISIS       0.878   
t-value       1.034   
D_EXCRIS        -1.415  
t-value        -2.590***  
FINREF_XN         -3.096 
t-value         -1.971** 
obs 1450 1450 1450 1310 1302 664 1450 1427 1177 
adj r2 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.982 0.975 0.977 0.981 0.981 0.979 
dw 1.719 1.719 1.715 1.675 1.741 1.701 1.71 1.69 1.653 
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All specifications use a fixed effects estimator and heteroscadisticity-consistent standard 
errors. WSAP: adjusted private-sector wage share; GROWTH: growth of real GDP; 
FINGLOB: financial globalisation; OPEN: openness; GDPPW: GDP per worker; CG: 
government consumption as share of GDP; AG: agricultural employment share; IND: 
industrial employment share; D_OECD: dummy variable for high-income OECD countries; 
TOT: terms of trade; UNEMPL: unemployment rate; ICT: information and communication 
technology assets as share of GDP; D_CRISIS: dummy for crisis years; D_EXCRIS: dummy 
variable for exchange rate crisis; FINREF_XN: financial reform index;  
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Table 4. Results by income group 
 
1 2 3 5 
  
6 
 
lowin lowmidin upmidin OECD 
 
OECD 
GROWTH -20.47 -26.616 -13.337 -9.557 
 
GROWTH -16.434 
t-value -1.365 -2.011** -3.322*** -3.495*** 
 
t-value -5.212*** 
LOG(FINGLOB) -2.4 -5.045 -2.456 -1.765 
 
LOG(FINGLOB) -2.418 
t-value -0.695 -1.435 -2.367** -3.328*** 
 
t-value -3.370*** 
OPEN 12.834 -11.455 -7.558 -2.538 
 
OPEN -5.888 
t-value 1.742* -1.770* -3.259*** -2.229** 
 
t-value -3.206*** 
      
TOT -4.546 
      
t-value -2.570** 
CG -0.988 0.847 0.69 0.801 
 
CG 0.929 
t-value -1.778* 2.464** 2.535** 4.472*** 
 
t-value 3.836*** 
      
UNION 0.099 
      
t-value 1.782* 
LOG(GDPPW) -7.457 23.666 8.278 -3.694 
 
LOG(KL_KLEMS) -7.034 
t-value -0.596 2.508** 2.469** -1.436 
 
t-value -1.821* 
AG -0.548 -0.07 -0.329 -0.319 
 
LOG(ICT_KLEMS) 1.436 
t-value -1.945* -0.388 -2.581** -2.746*** 
 
t-value 1.635 
IND -0.124 0.621 -0.211 -0.412 
   t-value -0.414 2.981*** -2.730*** -6.677*** 
   
        
        obs 50 101 426 836 
 
obs 470 
adj r2 0.991 0.988 0.967 0.954 
 
adj r2 0.94 
dw 1.857 2.04 1.721 1.576 
 
dw 1.814 
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All specifications use a fixed effects estimator and heteroscadisticity-consistent standard 
errors. WSAP: adjusted private-sector wage share; GROWTH: growth of real GDP; 
FINGLOB: financial globalisation; OPEN: openness; GDPPW: GDP per worker; CG: 
government consumption as share of GDP; AG: agricultural employment share; IND: 
industrial employment share;. LOWIN: low income countries; LOWMIDIN: lower middle 
income countries; UPMIDIN: upper middle income countries: OECD: high income OECD 
countries. UNION: organisational strength of unions (% of labour force); KL_KLEMS: 
capital-labour ratio; ICT_KLEMS: ICT services 
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Table 5. Results by estimation method 
 1 
FE 
2 
diff 
3 
5yr 
4 
GMM 
lag.dep.var.   0.766 
t-value    41.65*** 
GROWTH -11.936 -12.147 -32.411 -7.882 
t-value -4.167*** -4.146*** -2.636***  -3.996 *** 
LOG(FINGLOB) -3.659 -2.65 -2.975 -1.368 
t-value -6.997*** -4.140*** -2.705***  -6.542*** 
OPEN -3.811 -4.449 -5.802 -0.340 
t-value -3.211*** -3.200*** -1.970* -0.413 
LOG(GDPPW) -0.658 4.954 -2.527 0.813 
t-value -0.321 2.048** -0.761 0.763 
CG 0.801 0.74 -0.043 -0.010 
t-value 3.975*** 3.573*** -0.129 -0.065 
AG -0.235 -0.28 0.013 0.029 
t-value -2.719*** -2.971*** 0.041 0.579 
IND -0.159 -0.196 -0.038 -0.093 
t-value -2.457** -2.910*** -0.335  -6.272*** 
obs 1450 1450 281 1392 
adj r2 0.981 0.173 0.969  NA 
dw 1.719 1.744 2.327  NA 
 
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All specifications use a fixed effects estimator and heteroscadisticity-consistent standard 
errors. WSAP: adjusted private-sector wage share; GROWTH: growth of real GDP; 
FINGLOB: financial globalisation; OPEN: openness; GDPPW: GDP per worker; CG: 
government consumption as share of GDP; AG: agricultural employment share; IND: 
industrial employment share; FE: fixed effects estimator; DIFF: difference estimator; 5YR: 
non-overlapping five year averages; GMM: GMM estimator 
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Table 6. Results with labour market institutions variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
GROWTH -11.936 -13.275 -12.297 -12.551 -12.343 -12.297 -12.785 -11.878 
t-value -4.167*** -3.428*** -3.663*** -3.686*** -3.708*** -3.705*** -3.964*** -4.139*** 
LOG(FINGLOB) -3.659 -3.135 -2.746 -2.819 -2.689 -2.709 -3.152 -3.422 
t-value -6.997*** -4.874*** -4.806*** -4.946*** -4.698*** -4.855*** -5.802*** -6.627*** 
OPEN -3.811 -3.16 -4.675 -3.844 -4.782 -4.802 -3.678 -3.777 
t-value -3.211*** -2.112** -3.378*** -2.651*** -3.451*** -3.479*** -3.015*** -3.193*** 
LOG(GDPPW) -0.658 -2.556 -1.519 -2.086 -2.019 -1.991 1.201 -0.246 
t-value -0.321 -1.117 -0.667 -0.895 -0.927 -0.922 0.551 -0.119 
CG 0.801 0.62 0.623 0.432 0.563 0.573 0.773 0.795 
t-value 3.975*** 2.460** 3.039*** 1.965** 2.748*** 2.792*** 3.627*** 3.949*** 
AG -0.235 -0.349 -0.293 -0.325 -0.287 -0.28 -0.245 -0.258 
t-value -2.719*** -2.911*** -2.611*** -2.665*** -2.590*** -2.513** -2.572** -2.937*** 
IND -0.159 -0.101 -0.219 -0.177 -0.219 -0.219 -0.194 -0.166 
t-value -2.457** -1.2 -2.787*** -2.145** -2.765*** -2.766*** -2.816*** -2.557** 
MW_MNW -0.478       
t-value  -0.288       
UB_GRR1   -2.512      
t-value   -1.314      
UB_COVERAGE   0.513     
t-value    0.62     
EPL_AN4Y     -1.222    
t-value     -1.624    
EPL_SP4Y      0.082   
t-value      0.225   
LOG(LF)       4.996  
t-value       1.347  
LOG(POP)        -9.749 
t-value        -1.543 
obs 1450 718 1007 878 1026 1026 1242 1450 
adj r2 0.981 0.974 0.981 0.98 0.981 0.981 0.982 0.981 
dw 1.719 1.663 1.718 1.69 1.696 1.714 1.738 1.715 
Note: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
All specifications use a fixed effects estimator and heteroscadisticity-consistent standard 
errors.WSAP: adjusted private-sector wage share; GROWTH: growth of real GDP; 
FINGLOB: financial globalisation; OPEN: openness; GDPPW: GDP per worker; CG: 
government consumption as share of GDP; AG: agricultural employment share; IND: 
industrial employment share; MW_MNW: minimum wage relative to mean wage; 
UB_GRR1: unemployment benefit replacement ratio; UB_COVERAGE: unemployment 
benefit coverage ratio; EPL_AN4Y: employment protection legislation index; EPL_SP4Y: 
severance pay regulation index; LF: labour force; POP: population 
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Figure 1. Adjusted wage shares in advanced countries, Germany, the USA and Japan, 1970-2010 
 
Note: ADV stands for unweighted average of high income OECD countries
7
  
Source: AMECO 
 
  
                                                 
7
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
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Figure 2. Adjusted wage share in developing countries 
 
Note: DVP3: unweighted average of Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey; DVP5: unweighted 
average of China, Kenya, Mexico, South Korea, and Turkey; DVP16: unweighted average of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Kenya, Mexico, Namibia, Oman, Panama, Peru, 
Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey 
Source: see text 
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Figure 3. Contributions to the change in the wage share for all countries, 1990/94 to 2000/04  
 
Fin: financialisation; glob: globalisation; tech: technological change; wfst: welfare state 
retrenchment. Contributions are calculated as estimated coefficients (specification 1 of Table 
3) times the actual change of the explanatory variables from 1990-94 to 2000-04. 
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Figure  4. Contribution to change in the wage share for developing countries, 1990/94 to 2000/04 
 
Fin: financialisation; glob: globalisation; tech: technological change; wfst: welfare state 
retrenchment. Contributions are calculated as estimated coefficients (specification 1 of Table 
3) times the actual change of the explanatory variables from 1990-94 to 2000-04. 
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